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Abstract
Craigslist, a website that hosts job- and help-wanted ads, expanded rapidly across
the states in the USA over a very short period of time, thereby changing abruptly the
market structure faced by competing employment websites. We exploit this abrupt
change to evaluate its impact on competing websites’ online traffic and pricing. We
find that Craigslist’s entry was associated with a decrease in the number of visitors
that an average competing employment website attracted and with a decrease in
the number of pages an average visitor reviewed during a typical visit. We also find
that employment websites lowered some of the fees they charged their users.
Overall, these findings offer one explanation for why Craigslist, despite its popularity,
had little effect on the unemployment rate in the labor markets it entered: the entry
of Craigslist cannibalized online traffic at competing employment websites.
JEL Classification: J20, L10, L86
Keywords: Entry response, Employment website, Craigslist
1 Introduction
By reducing the costs of disseminating and acquiring information, the Internet brought
the possibility of substantially reduced search frictions and improved functioning of
the labor market (Autor, 2001). Kroft and Pope (2014), however, find that the entry
into local labor markets of Craigslist, a popular website that hosts job ads, had no
effect on unemployment rates in these markets. While the authors speculate (p. 298)
that Craigslist’s effect might have been attenuated by the fact that Craigslist provided a
service that was already offered by existing competing websites, the authors do not test
empirically their hypothesis.1,2
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the effects of Craigslist’s entry on
competing employment websites. We use a panel of websites hosting job boards and
resume banks from 2005 to 2007, a period of rapid expansion of Craigslist across the
states in the USA. Similar to Kroft and Pope (2014) and Chan and Ghose (2014), we
argue that the sudden rise in popularity of Craigslist during this period changed
abruptly the market structure faced by competing employment websites. We exploit
this abrupt change to evaluate its impact on competing websites’ online traffic and
pricing. Our analysis draws on a comparison across employment websites that faced
varying degrees of competition from Craigslist.
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We measure exposure to Craigslist with the number of job-related postings on
Craigslist and the number of years since Craigslist’s entry in the market in which com-
peting websites operate. We code employment websites that served a particular US
state as competing with Craigslist if Craigslist entered at least one city in that state. For
websites serving the entire USA, we consider two treatments. In the first treatment,
these websites are coded as competing with Craigslist once Craigslist entered its first
city. In the second, these websites are coded as not competing with Craigslist. To con-
trol for heterogeneity across employment websites, we control for time-varying
website-level attributes (e.g., the number of different types of postings that the websites
hosted, services offered by the websites, age) and add website-level fixed effects. We
also include controls for attributes of the markets that employment websites
served (e.g., unemployment rate, job creation rate, educational attainment,
Internet access by residents, population size and density, fraction of workers
employed in information sector).
We find that Craigslist’s entry into the markets of competing employment websites
was associated with a decline in both the number of visitors that an average competing
website attracted and the number of pages an average visitor reviewed while on these
websites. For example, the average number of visitors to a competing employment web-
site declined by 3740 whereas the number of page views per visitor to a competing
website declined by 1 for every additional 100 job-related postings that Craigslist
hosted in the competing website’s market. We also find that employment websites
reacted to increased competition for online users prompted by Craigslist’s entry by
adjusting some of the fees they charged their users. Specifically, we document a decline
in the average fees that the websites charged to employers and an increase in the likeli-
hood that job searchers and employers were offered a discount as Craigslist became
more entrenched in the markets of competing employment websites.
These findings are consistent with the view that the absence of beneficial effects of
Craigslist’s entry into local labor markets in the USA documented by Kroft and Pope
(2014) can be attributed in part to a business-stealing effect. That is, Craigslist’s entry
into local labor markets in the USA resulted in no distinguishable change in the
unemployment rate in these markets because it cannibalized online traffic at com-
peting websites.
The paper’s findings also suggest that Craigslist’s entry might have had mixed welfare
effects. In other words, while increased competition prompted by Craigslist’s entry
benefitted online users by resulting in lower prices at competing employment websites,
the entry also reduced online traffic at these websites. Because the gains of visiting
these websites increase the more these websites get used by other participants (a fea-
ture that is inherent to platforms, like employment websites, that operate in multi-
sided markets), Craigslist’s entry rendered these websites less useful to their potential
users by reducing their online traffic.3
Our findings contribute to three areas of research. First, our focus on interactions be-
tween employment websites complements studies that analyze data from a single em-
ployment website. These studies examine how employers and job searchers search with
the help of these websites (with data from Monster in Brenčič and Norris (2010),
Snagajob in Kudlyak et al. (2013), and CareerBuilder in Marinescu and Rathelot (2014))
and the implications of their use for search outcomes (with data from oDesk in Stanton
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and Thomas (2015), Agrawal et al. (2013), Pallais (2014), and Horton (2016)). Unlike
these studies that focus on the users’ experience with a single employment website, our
focus is on the market for these websites.
Second, our findings contribute to other studies on the effects of Craigslist’s expan-
sion in the USA. In addition to Kroft and Pope (2014), a study by Seamans and Zhu
(2014) is closely related to our paper because of its focus on the effect of Craigslist’s
entry on pricing (together with circulation and provision of content) in the market for
newspapers. Chan and Ghose (2014) focus on the effect of Craigslist’s entry on new
HIV cases, while Gurun and Butler (2012) on the use of slant by local newspapers.
Unlike these papers that focus on how the diffusion of the Internet—as represented by
entry of an online intermediary—affects activities offline (e.g., decision-making by
newspaper, sexual behavior), our study examines Craigslist’s effects on activities online
(i.e., online traffic at and pricing by competing online intermediaries).
Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on the reactions of incumbents to
new entrants and, specifically, to studies that focus on reactions by platforms in multi-
sided markets to changes in market structure (Jin and Rysman (2015), Chandra and
Collard-Wexler (2009), Fan (2013), and Seamans and Zhu (2014)). While in our study a
change in market structure is triggered by the entry of a new competitor as in Seamans
and Zhu, in other studies, it occurs as a result of mergers (Chandra and Collard-Wexler
and Fan) or a change in the definition of a geographical market (Jin and Rysman). The
distinguishing features of our analysis are its focus on (a) online platforms in the labor
market and (b) joint examination of the effect of a change in market structure prompted
by Craigslist’s entry on employment websites’ traffic, prices, use of discounts, and use of
bundling of services the websites offer their users.4
We start with a description of the data and our empirical approach in Section 2. In
Sections 3 and 4, we review our results. In Section 5, we review evidence from two
robustness checks that include an alternative measure of Craigslist’s presence in the
markets of competing websites and an alternative sample period. Concluding remarks
are delegated to Section 6.
2 Description of data and empirical approach
We use data from Weddle’s two biennial Guides to Employment Web Sites (Weddle,
2005, 2007).5 In 2005 and 2007, a representative sample of 350 employment websites
was surveyed. We drop from the sample websites that served markets outside of the
USA, websites for which information on key variables was not available, and—given
our inclusion of website-level fixed effects—websites for which data are available in
only one survey. As a result of these restrictions, our sample over-represents large em-
ployment websites (i.e., websites that attract a large number of visitors and host a large
number of postings) and those that serve the entire US market.6
For each website, we use information about the number of visitors and the number
of page views per visitor in a typical month as proxies for how successful the website
was in facilitating the exchange of information between its users. We also observe when
and whether a website served a state or the entire USA. Regional websites served be-
tween 7 and 15 different US states in the samples that we use to get our estimates. We
use this information in order to identify whether a website was exposed to Craigslist’s
entry during the sample period. We collected data on the cities entered and the
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corresponding years of entry from Craigslist’s website (www.craigslist.org). We sup-
plemented this information with information from archived Craigslist webpages
(www.archive.org) as in Seamans and Zhu (2014).
We code a website that served a particular US state as competing with Craigslist if
Craigslist entered at least one city in that state. 7 For websites that served the entire
USA, we consider two different treatments. We either code the websites as competing
with Craigslist once Craigslist entered its first city or we code them as not competing
with Craigslist.8 The first treatment might be preferred on two counts. First, national
websites facilitate search across states in a similar way as Craigslist. For example, while
national websites allow their users to search postings by state using a search engine,
Craigslist offers links that direct users to postings on Craigslist’s websites that serve in-
dividual US states (www.craigslist.ca/about/sites#US). Second, evidence suggests that
Craigslist’s popularity rivaled that of national websites like Monster, CareerBuilder, and
Yahoo! Hotjobs at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.9
Our focus on Craigslist is motivated by Kroft and Pope (2014) and Chan and Ghose
(2014) who document that Craigslist experienced a rapid increase in popularity across
different states in the USA over a very short period of time. Craigslist started in 1995
as an email distribution list and was launched as a website in 1996 for the San
Francisco area. The company was incorporated in 1999 and began to expand across the
USA with most of its expansion taking place over a very short period of a couple of
years. In contrast, other well-known employment websites experienced increases in
popularity at much steadier paces (Kroft and Pope, p. 269). This feature of Craigslist’s
entry ensures large spatial and temporal variation in the market structure that existing
competing employment websites faced.
Our empirical approach requires the random entry of Craigslist. Both Kroft and Pope
(2014) and Chan and Ghose (2014) find that Craigslist’s entry is poorly explained by at-
tributes of the markets it entered. The authors interpret this finding as supporting the
view that Craigslist’s entry was akin to a random event. Chan and Ghose, for example,
describe geographic and temporal variation in Craigslist’s entry as a natural experiment.
Kroft and Pope also note that Craigslist’s entry into a market was not based on ex-
pected profits because of the nonprofit nature of the website. If Craigslist’s entry was
not random, however, the direction of the bias for our estimates is unclear. Kroft and
Pope (p. 274) mention that Craigslist enters a new city on the basis of the number of
requests that they receive. If most requests are received from markets that are not ser-
viced by other employment websites, then Craigslist’s entry into these under-served
areas is expected to have a smaller effect on competing websites.10
Our focus on the period from 2005 through 2007 is motivated, on the one hand, by
the fact that Craigslist experienced a dramatic upsurge in popularity in 2005. Prior to
2005, the number of postings hosted by Craigslist was relatively small (Kroft and Pope,
2014).11 On the other hand, Weddle’s surveys conducted after 2007 restricted data col-
lection to only 100 websites thereby changing the representativeness of our sample.
Three other comments about our sample period are worth mentioning. First, given
that the sample of websites that were surveyed changed over time, the expansion of the
sample would result in an unbalanced panel of websites. This would lead to a concern
that our estimates are affected by the change in the composition of websites over time.
Second, our restriction to a short time period makes our analysis less susceptible to
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omitted variable bias due to shocks that might have occurred in the market of employ-
ment websites. Finally, our restriction makes the time frame of our analysis similar to
that of Kroft and Pope (2014). This similarity matters given our interest in providing an
explanation for Kroft and Pope’s null result.
We regressed either the number of visitors or the number of page views per visitor
to website i on a variable that measures the presence of Craigslist in each website’s
market:
online trafficit ¼ α0 þ α1 Craigslist presenceit þ βXit þ δi þ ηt þ εit
Craigslist’s presence is measured in one of two ways. First, we include the number of
years since Craigslist’s entry. Second, we include the number of help- and job-wanted
postings hosted by Craigslist in the market in which the competing website operates.12
In this latter case, we also control for all other postings on Craigslist to account for het-
erogeneity in Craigslist’s popularity across the markets. These other types of postings
include personals, “for sale” ads, ads related to housing, and ads related to community
events. In all specifications, we cluster errors at the level of the market (state or the en-
tire USA) to allow for autocorrelation.
Whereas Craigslist websites were nearly identical across the different markets
(Seamans and Zhu (2014, p. 480)), competing websites from the Guides were not. This
heterogeneity might affect our dependent variables, i.e., how much information is ac-
quired on the websites. For this reason, we added controls (Xit) for the number of dif-
ferent types of postings that the websites hosted, the complementary services offered
by the websites (e.g., email alerts of good matches, availability of career information),
the number of job and CV postings on a website, whether the website was national, the
age of the website (and its square) which we define as the difference between the year
in the sample and the year the website was founded, and the receipt of Weddle’s User’s
Choice Award as a time-varying proxy for quality.
Because all specifications include website-level fixed effects (δi), we exploit within-
website variation to identify effects of Craigslist’s entry in the websites’ markets. To ac-
count for time-varying factors specific to a website’s market, we include a year dummy
(ηt), the job creation rate and unemployment rates, % of residents with Internet ac-
cess,13 % of residents with a college degree, % of workers employed in the information
industry, log population, and population density in the market served by each web-
site.14 Similar to Kroft and Pope (2014), these controls aim to account for the way the
states might have changed technologically and for economic shocks that affected differ-
ently states that differed in size.
Table 1 reports summary statistics.15 An average website in our sample hosted about
1,081,600 visitors in a typical month, 41,275 job postings, and 361,729 CVs. An average
visitor reviewed about 20 pages during a typical visit. Both measures of online traffic in-
creased in 2007/2008 compared to 2005/2006 (top row in Table 2); the number of
monthly visitors increased by 33 %, on average, while the number of page views per vis-
itor increased by 116 %. The average fees that the websites charged their users were
about $4 per day per job posting, ¢0.3 per day per CV posting, and $266 per month for
access to CVs. Free access to CVs was offered to employers who paid a fee for posting
a job ad by 25 % of the websites. Employers and job searchers, respectively, were of-
fered a discount of 42 and 2 % by the websites.
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According to Table 1, an average age of a website is 7 years. In the sample, only 2 %
of the websites were general in the sense that they posted any type of a CV or a job
opening. Websites that specialized in a particular occupation or industry hosted on
average one and two different types of CVs and job postings, respectively. The majority
of the websites in the sample (65 %) served the entire USA while the rest served a state
within the USA. Most websites offered career-related information (93 %) and subscrip-
tion to email alerts of good matches (80 %). In terms of the attributes of the markets
that the websites served, an average website served a market where 68 % of residents
had Internet access, 28 % of residents had a college degree, and 2 % of the employed
Table 1 Summary statistics
Sample: A panel of employment websites (2005/06–2007/08)
Mean SD
Website-level attributes
# of visitors (in 100,000) in a month 10.816 28.630
# of page views per visit 19.634 54.645
Job posting fee per day of posting 3.617 2.909
CV posting fee per day of posting 0.003 0.020
CV access fee per month of access 266.069 300.079
Free access to CVs with purchase of job ad 0.251 0.434
Discount offered to employers 0.419 0.495
Discount offered to job searchers 0.019 0.139
Age of website 7.245 2.893
Receipt of Weddle’s choice award 0.027 0.164
General website 0.018 0.135
# of job categories on website 2.429 1.138
# of CV categories on website 1.594 1.218
National website 0.649 0.478
Career info offered 0.931 0.253
Match notification offered 0.800 0.401
# of job postings 41,275 174,635
# of CV postings 361,729 1,398,824
Market-level attributes
Residents with internet access (in %) 67.934 2.513
Log population 18.327 1.718
Population density 162.073 186.704
Residents with college degree (in %) 27.958 2.534
Employment in information sector (in %) 2.266 0.355
Unemployment rate 4.872 0.447
Job creation rate 15.730 1.113
Craigslist exposure
Job postings on Craigslist (in 1000)a 909.443 839.953
Job postings on Craigslist (in 1000)b 5.743 13.434
Years of Craigslist’s presencea 8.349 2.933
Years of Craigslist’s presenceb 1.560 2.828
aNational websites compete with Craigslist
bNational websites do not compete with Craigslist
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worked in the information sector. An average labor market was characterized by 4.9 %
unemployment rate and 15.7 % job creation rate.
Table 1 also reports summary statistics for Craigslist’s presence as measured by either
the number of job-related postings or the number of years of Craigslist’s presence for
two different treatments of national websites: one coding national websites as compet-
ing with Craigslist and the other coding them as not competing with Craigslist. When
national websites are coded as competing with Craigslist, Craigslist hosted 909,443 job-
related postings in an average market and had been present, on average, for 8 years.16
When national websites are coded as not competing with Craigslist, Craigslist hosted
5743 job-related postings in an average market and had been present for about
2 years.17
3 Craigslist’s impact on online traffic at competing websites
In Table 2, we report the average growth of online traffic for websites that differ in their
exposure to Craigslist. We measure exposure with the growth in the number of job
posts on Craigslist in the markets of competing websites or the number of years of
Craigslist’s presence. We find that the growth in the number of visitors was about one
to six times lower (columns 1 and 3 in Table 2) for websites that were most exposed to
Craigslist’s presence (top five percentile) compared to those that were least exposed to
Craigslist’s presence (in the bottom five percentile based on either the growth of jobs
on Craigslist or the years of Craigslist’s presence).18
Table 2 Growth in online traffic by exposure to Craigslist’s presence
Sample A panel of employment websites (2005/06–2007/08)








Growth in # of page
views per
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average website 0.332 1.158 0.332 1.158
Exposure: growth of job posts on Craigslist
95 % percentile of
exposure
0.190 3.909 −0.825 12.271
5 % percentile of
exposure
0.563 0.156 −0.134 1.499
75 % percentile of
exposure
0.912 1.032 1.133 2.119
25 % percentile of
exposure
0.958 0.821 −0.022 0.160
Exposure: years of Craigslist presence
95 % percentile of
exposure
2.922 21.902 3.610 13.441
5 % percentile of
exposure
3.817 25.774 13.277 13.529
75 % percentile of
exposure
2.922 21.902 11.503 12.840
25 % percentile of
exposure
3.848 29.733 13.277 13.529
Growth is calculated as
x2007=08−x2005=06
x2005=06
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The difference in the growth is smaller (between 5 and 32 %) when we compare em-
ployment websites that were more similar to each other in terms of their exposure to
Craigslist’s presence, i.e., the 25 % most and the 25 % least exposed websites. In one
comparison of eight, the difference in the growth of visitors between the most exposed
and the least exposed is reversed.19 Evidence is more mixed for page views. The growth
in the number of page views per visitor was faster for websites that were most exposed
to Craigslist’s presence compared to those that were least exposed (columns 2 and 4 in
Table 2) when exposure is measured with the growth in job posts on Craigslist. When
we measure exposure with the years of Craigslist’s presence, we find that the most ex-
posed websites hosted between 1 and 36 % fewer page views per visitor compared to
the least exposed employment websites.
These preliminary findings suggest that as Craigslist’s presence in a market grew,
competing employment websites lost online traffic as measured with the number of vis-
itors they attracted. Comparisons that are drawn on the basis of Table 2, however, offer
only preliminary observations because they do not account for heterogeneity across
markets and competing websites. Table 3 reports estimates of the effects of Craigslist’s
presence on the online traffic at competing employment websites—specifically, the
number of visitors and page views per visitor on competing websites—once we control
for observed website-level and market-level heterogeneity. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3
report evidence for a specification in which national websites are coded as competing
with Craigslist. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 report evidence for a specification in which
national websites do not compete with Craigslist.
Estimates in column 1 reveal that the number of visitors that an average website
attracted in a typical month decreased with Craigslist’s presence. In particular, for every
100 job postings that Craigslist hosted about 3740 fewer visitors were attracted to an
Table 3 Craigslist entry and online traffic at competing employment websites
Sample A panel of employment websites (2005/06–2007/08)
Treatment of national websites National websites compete with
Craigslist
National websites do not compete
with Craigslist












Measure of exposure (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Craigslist’s entry −5.597 −19.729 −5.859 −23.586
(0.340)*** (15.101) (0.357)*** (14.079)*
Number of job ads on Craigslist
(in 1000)
−0.374 −7.390 −0.274 −6.649
(0. 008)*** (1.183)*** (0.037)*** (3.343)*
Controls: website FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: website attributes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: market attributes ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of dependent variable 11.504 22.072 11.504 22.072
Observations 66 126 66 126
Number of websites 33 63 33 63
Standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
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average competing website (column 1 in Table 3). The number of visitors to an average
competing employment website decreased by an estimated 559,700 for every additional
year Craigslist was present in the market (column 1 in Table 3). The average number of
visitors in 2005/06 was 1,037,890 whereas in 2007/08 it was 1,262,823. We find a simi-
lar pattern when we code websites that serve the entire USA as not competing with
Craigslist (column 3 in Table 3).
The average visitor also reviewed fewer pages the longer Craigslist operated in the
market and the more postings Craigslist hosted (columns 2 and 4 in Table 3). The aver-
age number of page views per visitor at a competing website declined by about 20 for
every additional year of Craigslist’s presence in the market since its entry (columns 2
and 4 in Table 3). Similarly, for every 100 job postings on Craigslist, the number of
page views per visitor that a competing website attracted fell by, on average, 1 (column
2 in Table 3). The average number of page views in 2005/06 was 17 whereas in 2007/08
it was 27. We find a similar pattern when we code national websites as not competing
with Craigslist (column 4 in Table 3).
4 Craigslist’s impact on pricing by competing websites
Our findings thus far indicate that an increase in Craigslist’s presence was associated
with a decline in online traffic at competing employment websites. This evidence is
consistent with the view that the entry of Craigslist cannibalized online traffic at com-
peting employment websites. In this section, we want to check whether a decline in the
online traffic was caused by an increase in prices that competing employment websites
charged their users rather than a change in competition faced by the websites. Accord-
ing to Table 4, however, the declines in visitors and page views per visitor as Craigslist
became more entrenched in local labor markets were accompanied by either a decrease
in the fees or no change in the fees.
Specifically, average fees for posting a job ad at competing websites decreased by an
estimated $2.4 per day of posting a job ad (column 1 in Table 4) for every year that the
websites faced competition from Craigslist. This estimate is not statistically significant
when national websites are coded as not competing with Craigslist (column 4 in
Table 4). We find evidence that Craigslist’s entry resulted in a drop in a fee by $28.8 for
a month of access to CV postings only when national websites are coded as not com-
peting with Craigslist. Craigslist’s entry had no effect when these websites were coded
as competing with Craigslist (columns 2 and 5 in Table 4). We find no evidence that
Craigslist’s entry had an effect on the price that the websites charged to job searchers
for posting a CV (columns 3 and 6 in Table 4).20
We extend our analysis of pricing along two dimensions. First, we check whether
websites were more likely to offer a discount (Table 5). In the data, we observe whether
discounts were based on the type of a posting (career level, volunteering opportunities,
occupation), firm type (nonprofit, government, size), volume (number or duration of
postings or access), or membership. We can distinguish whether the discount was of-
fered to employers or to job searchers. We find some evidence that Craigslist’s entry in-
creased the likelihood that a discount was offered to both employers and job searchers
(columns 1, 2, and 5 in Table 5). For example, the likelihood that a competing website
offered a discount to employers and job searchers, respectively, increased by 8 and 7 %
for every 100 job postings that Craigslist hosted (columns 1 and 2 in Table 5). Hence,
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while we find some evidence that Craigslist’s entry caused a decline in the listed prices,
this evidence is not robust to different treatment of national websites. Nevertheless,
our follow-up analysis of the provision of discounts suggests that it is likely that the
prices that were actually paid by the users of employment websites fell with Craigslist’s
entry as discounts for both employers and job searchers became more prevalent.
Second, we check whether websites were more likely to bundle together services that
they offered to employers. Specifically, we observe whether employers were granted free
access to CVs whenever they paid a fee for a job posting. We speculate that such
bundling of the two services might become more likely as competition intensifies as a
way to secure participation on a platform. We find, however, no evidence that the
websites were more likely to bundle access to CVs and posting of a job ad (columns 3
and 6 in Table 5).
5 Robustness checks
Measurement of Craigslist’s presence: We used the number of cities within each state
that Craigslist entered as an alternative measure of Craigslist’s presence while control-
ling for population size and population density. The estimates from this alternative
specification are reported in Table 6. We find evidence that a greater Craigslist’s
presence reduced the number of visitors to competing employment websites. No effect
is found of Craigslist’s presence on either competing websites’ pricing or the number of
page views per visitor.
Sample period: Our analysis is restricted to a period from 2005 to 2007. This restric-
tion is motivated by several factors that we review in our description of our empirical
Table 4 Craigslist entry and pricing by competing employment websites
Sample A panel of employment websites (2005/06–2007/08)
National websites compete with Craigslist National websites do not compete with
Craigslist


















Measure of exposure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since Craigslist’s
entry
−2.413 −254.741 −0.002 −0.033 −35.228 0.001
(1.515)* (199.591) (0.010) (0.160) (56.968) (0.002)
Number of job ads on
Craigslist (in 1000)
0.009 75.921 0.000 0.044 −28.840*** 0.000
(0.072) (60.719) (0.001) (0.036) (2.152) (0.000)
Controls: website FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: website
attributes
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: market
attributes
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of dependent
variable
3.363 263.992 0.003 3.363 263.992 0.003
Observations 180 82 184 180 82 184
Number of websites 90 41 92 90 41 92
Standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
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approach. We expanded the sample to include years prior to 2005 (Weddle, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). We report the results in Table 7. In general, we find that fewer
estimates are statistically significant. This is consistent with some of the concerns that
we raised about extending our analysis beyond the 2-year period that is the focus of
most of our estimates, most notably, the fact that Craigslist became a large player only
in 2005 (Kroft and Pope, 2014). Because our sample extension includes years prior to
2005, the estimates pertain to the effects of Craigslist’s entry in markets during the
times when Craigslist was too small to matter.
That said, we do find several statistically significant estimates. These estimates
suggest, for example, that an additional year of Craigslist’s presence in a market
was associated with a decrease in the number of average page views per visitor by
three (column 2), an increase by 1 percentage point in the likelihood that job
searchers were offered a discount (column 7), and a decrease by 46 percentage
points in the likelihood that employers were offered a discount (column 6). One
thousand additional job ads on Craigslist were linked to a decline in the fee for
access to CVs by $2 per month of access (column 4). These estimates tend to be
sensitive to whether or not we code national websites to be competing with
Craigslist.
Table 5 Craigslist entry and pricing by competing employment websites
Sample A panel of employment websites (2005/06–2007/08)
National websites compete with Craigslist National websites do not compete with
Craigslist
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since
Craigslist’s entry
0.106 −0.053 0.315 −0.007 0.011 −0.022
(0.410) (0.036) (0.349) (0.050) (0.006)* (0.026)
Number of job ads
on Craigslist (in
1000)
0.036 0.002 −0.027 −0.082 0.002 −0.016
(0.007)*** (0.001)* (0.018) (0.097) (0.001)* (0.013)
Controls: website
FE
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: website
attributes
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls: market
attributes
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mean of dependent
variable
0.440 0.027 0.314 0.440 0.027 0.314
Observations 116 188 188 116 188 188
Number of
websites
58 94 94 58 94 94
Standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
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6 Conclusions
We find that Craigslist’s entry into a local labor market was associated with a decrease
in the number of visitors and page views per visitor at competing employment web-
sites. This finding speaks to evidence in Kroft and Pope (2014) that Craigslist entry had
no effect on the unemployment rate in local labor markets. Consistent with Kroft and
Pope’s proposed explanation for their null result (p. 298), our finding suggests that
Craigslist’s entry had a muted effect on local labor markets, in part, because Craigslist
cannibalized online traffic at competing websites that offered similar services at the
time of Craigslist’s entry.
We also observe that websites reacted to increased competition prompted by Craigs-
list’s entry by decreasing some of the fees that they charged to their users. Overall,
these findings suggest that Craigslist’s entry might have had mixed welfare effects. In-
creased competition and the resulting reduction in prices prompted by the entry likely
benefitted participants in these markets. At the same time, however, Craigslist’s entry
Table 6 Alternative measure of exposure to Craigslist












































−2.100 −0.001 −0.000 0.247 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.050)*** (0.217) (0.001) (0.692) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)






−8.683 −7.398 0.067 7.583 0.000 0.152 0.003 −0.037
(0.066)*** (3.598)* (0.158) (31.174) (0.001) (0.135) (0.004) (0.047)
Controls:
website FE
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Controls:
year FE












11.504 22.072 3.363 263.992 0.003 0.440 0.027 0.314
Observations 66 126 180 82 184 116 188 188
Number of
websites
33 63 90 41 92 58 94 94
Standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
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rendered each existing competing website less thick and thus less valuable to individual
users. In a broader sense, our findings reveal the difficulties (a) of evaluating the impact
of diffusion of the Internet on activities offline when diffusion is measured with an
entry of a single online entity such as Craigslist and (b) with translating improvements
in search technologies into more efficient labor markets.
Endnotes
1By contrast, Kroft and Pope (2014) find that Craigslist’s entry reduced vacancy rates
in the real-estate rental markets where online alternatives to Craigslist were few.
2An alternative explanation proposed by Kroft and Pope (2014) attributes their null
result to a possibility that the gains of using Craigslist are small because of small search
frictions and negligible information asymmetry in the US labor market.
3Some examples of platforms that operate in multi-sided markets include sports card
conventions that facilitate interactions between buyers and sellers of sports cards (Jin
and Rysman (2014)), newspapers that facilitate interactions between readers and
Table 7 Extension of the sample period (2000 through 2007)













































5.016 4.076 1.230 104.697 0.003 −0.463 0.008 −0.081






0.088 0.042 −0.064 −2.184 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.002
(0.081) (0.154) (0.045) (1.244)* (0.000)*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)





3.237 −2.756 −0.863 37.842 −0.000 0.031 0.008 −0.072






0.501 −0.391 0.014 37.943 0.000 0.019 0.000 −0.010




9.210 16.840 4.042 240.086 0.004 0.548 0.040 0.246
Observations 231 547 603 314 344 465 353 643
Standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %. Controls: see Table 3
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advertisers (Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009), Fan (2013), and Seamans and Zhu
(2014)), and employment websites that facilitate interactions between employers with
job vacancies and job searchers.
4Jin and Rysman (2014) focus on pricing by organizers of sports card conventions.
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) examine pricing and circulation in a market for
newspapers. Fan (2013) and Seamans and Zhu (2014) look at pricing, circulation, and
product attributes in a market for newspapers.
5Brenčič (2014) uses the same source of data to examine a link between the number
of pages a typical visitor to employment websites reviews and the number of postings
that are available for a review.
6According to the Guides, 40 % of the surveyed websites in each survey changed from
one survey to the next. Because the goal of the Guides is to report on the leading em-
ployment websites and websites that offer novel features, large websites are the most
likely to be represented in our sample.
7We define a relevant labor market at the level of a state because that is the
level for which competing employment websites’ markets are observed in the
data. Kroft and Pope (2014) define the market at the MSA level whereas Seamans
and Zhu (2014) define the relevant market at the county level. Chan and Ghose
(2014) define the market at the state level and at the county level for four US
states and NYC.
8In the samples that we used to get our estimates, between 63 and 80 % of the web-
sites served the entire USA. This is consistent with the fact that our sample over-
represents large employment websites. These websites are more likely to remain active
over the period during which the two Weddle surveys were conducted and are more
likely to be included in each of the two Weddle surveys.
9Kroft and Pope (2014, p. 261) note that the number of job-related posts on Craigslist
for major metropolitan areas represented two thirds of the total number of posts for
the areas on three large employment websites that serve the entire US market: Monster,
CareerBuilder, and Yahoo! Hotjobs.
10It is possible, however, that requests for Craigslist’s entry come from markets where
many employment websites offer services but, unlike Craigslist, charge high fees for
their services. In most markets, Craigslist does not charge for its services.
11Kroft and Pope (2014, p. 273) note that the number of posts was nearly zero in
most cities but for a select few larger cities.
12The data were collected from a website that archives old snapshots of websites
(http://archive.org). When data on more than one date were available, we chose a date
in the last quarter of a year. If Craigslist was present in multiple cities in a state, we
summed the number of posts across all the cities.
13Data for 2009 were assigned to the 2007/2008 survey, and data for 2007 to the
2005/2006 survey.
14The data were acquired from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
15The sample is restricted to websites that are surveyed in both Guides. Nevertheless,
the size of the sample varies across statistics because different websites have missing
values for different variables.
16In other words, the variable for Craigslist’s presence is assigned the sum of job-
related posts on Craigslist aggregated across all of Craigslist’s locations in the USA.
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17In other words, we set the number of posts on Craigslist equal to zero for observa-
tions from websites that served the entire USA.
18We report a range because of two treatments of employment websites that serve
the entire USA, i.e., in one treatment these websites are coded not to compete with
Craigslist while in the other treatment they are coded to compete with Craigslist.
19This reversed pattern occurs for the following: when exposure is measured with the
growth of job posts on Craigslist, we compare the 25 % most and the 25 % least
exposed websites, and when websites that serve the entire USA are coded as not
competing with Craigslist.
20Given that a majority did not charge a fee for a posting of a CV, we think that
insufficient variation in the dependent variable can explain statistically insignificant
effects in columns 3 and 6 in Table 4.
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